After an emphatic win by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the 2010 assembly election and more recently his conviction in fodder scam,Lalu Prasad was completely written off in Bihar politics. He got a new lease of life after NDA’s disintegration in the state and his alliance with the Congress, but the scope for his re-emergence was still considered limited.
During the initial two phases of polls in Bihar, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) under Lalu Prasad in the state was expected to put up a good fight, but the advantage was given to Narendra Modi-led NDA. However, in the last two weeks, a section of the media has gone overboard to predict a sweep for UPA in Bihar due to the consolidation of Muslim-Yadav (MY) votes and also a higher voter turnout.
As far as the voter turnout is concerned, it is not just limited to Bihar. Rather, this election is experiencing a huge and unprecedented bump of about 10% votes across the nation. Moreover, a deeper analysis suggests it is not just minorities, but also the majority population that has given an equal, if not extra, push to high polling. This publication carried an exclusive piece on this subject in its 1 May edition.
Let us analyse the potential of the MY factor in influencing the outcome of the ongoing Lok Sabha polls in Bihar. Sixteen percent Muslims and 14% Yadavs together account for about 30% of Bihar’s electorate. If we look at the spread of MY across its 40 parliamentary constituencies, there are five PCs with more than 40% and eight PCs with 30-40% combined MY electorate. Thus, UPA has the potential to present a formidable challenge in these 13 PCs, but still can’t win all 13 because Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) has failed to win several of these seats in the recent past despite polarizing MY. It is true MY consolidation will make UPA appear formidable, but just MY is not enough to win many seats unless there is support from other sections of voters.
Bihar’s electoral history since 1990 suggests Lalu Prasad could win 1990, 1995 and 2000 Assembly elections because, besides MY support, he had a huge fan following among 23% most backwards classes (MBCs) and 10% non-Paswan SCs (Mahadalits) due to his social justice plank. But NDA with the combined strength of Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Sawarn, Nitish Kumar’s other backward class (OBC) and Ram Vilas Paswan’s votes presented a tough challenge to Lalu Prasad and won the most seats in undivided Bihar in 1998 Lok Sabha elections. But once Paswan and the Congress joined hands with the RJD in 2004, the balance of electoral power shifted to Lalu Prasad and the UPA swept Bihar in 2004. Once again when Paswan left the UPA, just MY could not save Lalu Prasad’s fortunes in both the assembly elections of 2005. Therefore, just 30% MY can’t give RJD the winning edge unless it manages at least 5-10% support from other social segments.
The results of the 2005 and 2010 Assembly and 2009 Lok Sabha elections suggest that the poor sections of Bihar electorate mainly comprising of MBCs and Mahadalits have completely deserted the RJD. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that these social segments have any reason to go back to Lalu Prasad at least in this election. This is the same electorate which inspired Nitish Kumar to part ways with the BJP; therefore, only Nitish Kumar, and not Lalu Prasad, has the potential to challenge BJP’s growth among OBC and Dalits in Bihar.
It will be worthwhile to discuss a few important social engineering initiatives of the BJP which are likely to dilute the MY impact. BJP is no longer considered as a party of upper castes in Bihar due to Modi’s projection as an OBC leader, which got a further boost due to the recent “neech jaati” controversy. An unprecedented number of tickets given to OBCs is also expected to give further impetus to BJP’s effort in wooing OBCs. Inclusion of Upendra Kushwaha and Ram Vilas Paswan into NDA has not only added an additional 5% Kushwaha and 5% Paswan votes in its kitty, but has also helped BJP shed its upper caste image. Today, NDA in Bihar is poised to secure about 40% votes with near 100% consolidation of 15% Sawarn, 7% Baniya, 5% Kushwaha, 5% Paswan and more than 50% support of non-Yadav OBC, MBC and Mahadalits.
Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) is likely to get completely marginalized due to the erosion of its core constituency (MBC, Mahadalit and Kurmies) and consolidation of Muslims with RJD. On the other hand, despite MY consolidation, UPA does not look like getting more than 32-33% votes. Those who are presuming polarization of Yadavs with the UPA should also be mindful of the fact that a section of young aspiring Yadavs who want development and employment may get attracted to BJP. Such a trend is more likely in communally sensitive areas where counter-polarization of majority voters has been reported.
Therefore, it would not be inappropriate to conclude that MY consolidation is expected to resurrect Lalu Prasad in Bihar politics as the main challenger of a resurgent BJP, but UPA may still not be able to contain Narendra Modi’s march in Bihar beyond a point.
During the initial two phases of polls in Bihar, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) under Lalu Prasad in the state was expected to put up a good fight, but the advantage was given to Narendra Modi-led NDA. However, in the last two weeks, a section of the media has gone overboard to predict a sweep for UPA in Bihar due to the consolidation of Muslim-Yadav (MY) votes and also a higher voter turnout.
As far as the voter turnout is concerned, it is not just limited to Bihar. Rather, this election is experiencing a huge and unprecedented bump of about 10% votes across the nation. Moreover, a deeper analysis suggests it is not just minorities, but also the majority population that has given an equal, if not extra, push to high polling. This publication carried an exclusive piece on this subject in its 1 May edition.
Let us analyse the potential of the MY factor in influencing the outcome of the ongoing Lok Sabha polls in Bihar. Sixteen percent Muslims and 14% Yadavs together account for about 30% of Bihar’s electorate. If we look at the spread of MY across its 40 parliamentary constituencies, there are five PCs with more than 40% and eight PCs with 30-40% combined MY electorate. Thus, UPA has the potential to present a formidable challenge in these 13 PCs, but still can’t win all 13 because Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) has failed to win several of these seats in the recent past despite polarizing MY. It is true MY consolidation will make UPA appear formidable, but just MY is not enough to win many seats unless there is support from other sections of voters.
Bihar’s electoral history since 1990 suggests Lalu Prasad could win 1990, 1995 and 2000 Assembly elections because, besides MY support, he had a huge fan following among 23% most backwards classes (MBCs) and 10% non-Paswan SCs (Mahadalits) due to his social justice plank. But NDA with the combined strength of Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) Sawarn, Nitish Kumar’s other backward class (OBC) and Ram Vilas Paswan’s votes presented a tough challenge to Lalu Prasad and won the most seats in undivided Bihar in 1998 Lok Sabha elections. But once Paswan and the Congress joined hands with the RJD in 2004, the balance of electoral power shifted to Lalu Prasad and the UPA swept Bihar in 2004. Once again when Paswan left the UPA, just MY could not save Lalu Prasad’s fortunes in both the assembly elections of 2005. Therefore, just 30% MY can’t give RJD the winning edge unless it manages at least 5-10% support from other social segments.
The results of the 2005 and 2010 Assembly and 2009 Lok Sabha elections suggest that the poor sections of Bihar electorate mainly comprising of MBCs and Mahadalits have completely deserted the RJD. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that these social segments have any reason to go back to Lalu Prasad at least in this election. This is the same electorate which inspired Nitish Kumar to part ways with the BJP; therefore, only Nitish Kumar, and not Lalu Prasad, has the potential to challenge BJP’s growth among OBC and Dalits in Bihar.
It will be worthwhile to discuss a few important social engineering initiatives of the BJP which are likely to dilute the MY impact. BJP is no longer considered as a party of upper castes in Bihar due to Modi’s projection as an OBC leader, which got a further boost due to the recent “neech jaati” controversy. An unprecedented number of tickets given to OBCs is also expected to give further impetus to BJP’s effort in wooing OBCs. Inclusion of Upendra Kushwaha and Ram Vilas Paswan into NDA has not only added an additional 5% Kushwaha and 5% Paswan votes in its kitty, but has also helped BJP shed its upper caste image. Today, NDA in Bihar is poised to secure about 40% votes with near 100% consolidation of 15% Sawarn, 7% Baniya, 5% Kushwaha, 5% Paswan and more than 50% support of non-Yadav OBC, MBC and Mahadalits.
Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) is likely to get completely marginalized due to the erosion of its core constituency (MBC, Mahadalit and Kurmies) and consolidation of Muslims with RJD. On the other hand, despite MY consolidation, UPA does not look like getting more than 32-33% votes. Those who are presuming polarization of Yadavs with the UPA should also be mindful of the fact that a section of young aspiring Yadavs who want development and employment may get attracted to BJP. Such a trend is more likely in communally sensitive areas where counter-polarization of majority voters has been reported.
Therefore, it would not be inappropriate to conclude that MY consolidation is expected to resurrect Lalu Prasad in Bihar politics as the main challenger of a resurgent BJP, but UPA may still not be able to contain Narendra Modi’s march in Bihar beyond a point.
Source: LM
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